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


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ADDRESS
OF
HON. CHARLES H. ^{Henry}BELL.
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PLAN OF THE
SHOWING THE STAND MADE BY S



BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL.

AND REED'S NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENTS.

EXPLANATION OF THE PLAN.

At the top appears the Mystic River.

At the right is Moulton's (or Morton's) Point, where the British troops first landed and formed.

Extending downward from the shore of the Mystic, on the left, appear the rail fences, behind which were posted in their order Col. Stark's New Hampshire Regiment, Col. Reed's New Hampshire Regiment, and Capt. Knowlton's Connecticut companies.

In front of the rail fences are represented the eleven companies of British Grenadiers, in line, advancing to the attack; and on the beach of the Mystic River the eleven companies of British Light Infantry, marching with a narrow front, in their attempt to flank the American left. The numbers of the Regiments to which the Light Infantry companies severally belonged are given in the figures, as in the Plan of De Berniere.

The Light Infantry company of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment appears both on the river beach and on the higher bank at the right of the Grenadiers. It is supposed that in one attack it occupied one position and in the other attack a different one.

Below the rail fences and a little at their right appear the earthworks of Col. Prescott.

Charlestown neck is not represented on the plan. It would be much further to the left.

A D D R E S S .

GENTLEMEN OF THE ASSOCIATION :

I GLADLY avail myself of the privilege afforded me by the courteous invitation of your President, of appearing before you on this interesting anniversary to ask your attention to an account of the particular services rendered by the men of New Hampshire in the battle of Bunker Hill. Since the foundation of your Association a flood of light has been cast by the researches of historians upon the momentous events of the Seventeenth of June, 1775 ; and though there has been some conflict of testimony on minor matters connected with the Battle, yet on all points of real consequence the trustworthy authorities are substantially in accord, so that it is not difficult now for an impartial narrator to assign to each of the three colonies that furnished the combatants something near its just share in the transactions of the day.

This first deliberate trial of strength in the field of arms between the American colonists and the British soldiery has naturally been a favorite theme for speakers and writers. It is my misfortune, that, in order to point out the precise nature and extent of the service performed by the New Hampshire forces in the Battle, I must go prosaically over a part of the story that has been again and again told with all the force of eloquence and the beauties of poetry. The lessons of Bunker Hill, however, will bear repetition ; and unfortunate will it be for our land should the day ever come when they lose their interest and their significance.

E. L. B., Mon. 11, 1931.

The tidings of the British raid from Boston to Lexington and Concord, on the 19th of April, 1775, circulated like wild-fire through the neighboring country, rousing the sons of liberty on every side to hasten to the assistance of their aggrieved brethren of the Bay Colony. New Hampshire, though she had experienced little direct hardship from the aggressions of Britain, and though her government was administered by the friendly hand of one of her own sons, from sympathy and principle stood by Massachusetts in the time of her trial, and was second to no other colony in promptness and patriotic zeal when the call to arms was heard. On the morning of the 20th of April, 1775, the roads leading from the various sections of that province toward the scene of hostilities were fairly alive with men hastening to volunteer their services in this new crusade for liberty. From each of the principal New Hampshire towns and villages marched a strong company, under temporary officers of their own choice; and scarcely a hamlet was unrepresented in the numerous body that was soon gathered at the general rendezvous. In three days' time about two thousand New Hampshire men were assembled in arms at Cambridge.¹ They were without permanent organization, and had left their fields and workshops clad in the habiliments of their every-day labor, with no military insignia, but every one, with scarce an exception, equipped with his trusty firelock.

The great majority of them were young men, unused to military exercise; but among them were some of mature years, who had had experience in arms. The wars with the French and Indians were a school in which many of the provincials had taken their first lessons in the martial art, had received their baptism of fire, and had made themselves acquainted with the discipline which prevailed in the European armies. Those who had enjoyed these advantages were naturally looked to with respect and deference. Prominent among them was John Stark, who had acquired celebrity as a captain of rangers. Rugged and self-willed, but shrewd and fearless, he was a natural leader. Him the popular voice at

¹ Note I.

once hailed as a suitable commander for the first New Hampshire regiment; and so great was his prestige that recruits poured in upon him in superabundance.

James Reed was another veteran soldier of the seven-years war, and a patriotic, courageous, God-fearing man. Without the popular repute of Stark, he yet possessed qualities that inspired confidence in his fitness for command, and he also was designated for a colonel's commission. Of the three regiments which New Hampshire organized and completed at that time, Stark's was the first and Reed's the third; and both were stationed in the vicinity of Boston.

On the evening of the 16th of June, 1775, Col. William Prescott led his detachment of about one thousand men to occupy and fortify the height in Charlestown which has since been known as Bunker Hill. A part of his command, to which I shall again refer, was composed of New Hampshire men. The intrenchments which Prescott's party constructed were a square redoubt and breastwork, cast up from the soil by the strong arms of his soldiers. They were completed during the forenoon of the next day, in spite of a constant cannonade from the British shipping and batteries. On the south of these earthworks was the village of Charlestown; but on the north the land was open and unoccupied to the Mystic River, a distance of nearly one fifth of a mile.

As soon as the British officers in Boston were apprised of this venturesome step on the part of the provincials, a council of war was called, at which it was unanimously decided that the Americans must be dislodged from their threatening position. Against the judgment of some of his officers, General Gage, who had the supreme command, determined to attack the works in their front; and Gen. William Howe was designated to take charge of the enterprise. Preparations for the movement of the troops were at once begun; and Prescott soon became aware, by the unusual stir and activity in Boston, that he was about to be attacked. With a soldier's eye he could not fail to see that without strong supports he was liable to be surrounded by the enemy, when his situation would be hopeless; and he sent repeated requests to General Ward, at

Cambridge, for reinforcements. As soon as Ward became convinced that Charlestown was the real objective point of the British movement, he ordered the New Hampshire regiments of Stark and Reed to the assistance of Prescott. The one was at Medford, and the other near Charlestown Neck. Before they could be supplied with ammunition and reach the field, the forces of General Howe had crossed over in boats from Boston, and landed, under cover of the fire of the shipping, at Moulton's Point, in Charlestown.

At that time Prescott's command in the redoubt had become much reduced in numbers by the departure of many of his men for various causes. Among those who remained with him were a company of artillery and a detachment consisting originally of one hundred and twenty or perhaps two hundred men from the Connecticut regiment of General Putnam, and commanded by Captain Knowlton.

Ignorant, of course, how soon the enemy might move against his works, and alive to the vital necessity of some co-operation without for the protection of his exposed flank, Prescott ordered the artillery company to go forth and oppose the enemy, and the Connecticut detachment to support the artillery. They left the redoubt. The artillery proved inefficient; and Knowlton subsequently posted his detachment, probably by General Putnam's direction, behind a low stone wall, surmounted by an open wooden fence of two rails, at a point about six hundred feet in the rear of the northern end of the breastwork, thus filling a fractional part of the undefended space between the earthworks and the Mystic, but still leaving more than an eighth of a mile thereof unoccupied.

When the two New Hampshire regiments of Stark and Reed came upon the ground, it was plain to the practised eyes of their officers that this unoccupied space was the chief source of danger to the Americans. They therefore completed the line of defence from the intrenchments to the river by stationing their regiments behind a rail fence that ran in that direction. To give it the appearance of greater strength, they rested the materials of another fence against the first, and stuffed newly mown hay between them. The

fence extended to the high bank of the river, beneath which was a sandy shore wide enough for the passage of several men abreast. Across it they hastily threw together a loose wall of stones down to the water's edge. Behind this rail fence and stone screen the hardy sons of New Hampshire were posted, and thus closed the perilous gap on the left of the American line.¹

These preparations consumed some time, during which General Howe was making his dispositions for the assault. His force consisted of eleven² companies of grenadiers, as many of light infantry, five line-battalions, and a proportion of field artillery. He chose the grenadiers and light infantry, the *élite* of the several regiments from which they were detached, to form a storming party against the American lines between the earthworks and the Mystic, and of them he took the command in person. His other five battalions were ordered to act against the earthworks, under the direction of his brigadier, General Pigot.

Howe did not fail to perceive that the line extending to the Mystic was the key of the American position. If he could penetrate that obstacle, the rear of the earthworks would be gained, and their capture was inevitable. His plan of battle was, while a movement was making against the entire American line, for the light infantry in column of sections to follow the sandy shore of the Mystic under the high bank, and force their way past or through the ranks of the provincials; and for the grenadiers, marching on the higher ground of the bank, to deploy into line at a suitable distance, and advance upon the provincials in front. Before the combined onset of the two formidable bodies it was not doubted by the English, so contemptuous was their estimate of American soldiery, that the rustic medley would take instant flight from their extemporized defences, and thus leave the way open for both wings of the British army to encircle the earthworks with a wall of steel that must render them an easy conquest.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, in the lull just before the engagement, the scene must have been an imposing one.

¹ Note II.

² Note III.

The day was warm and sunny, the heavens were cloudless, the fields covered in part with ripening grass gently swayed by the summer breeze. In the stream rode the proud ships of war, their dark hulls and the meteor flag of England, which floated from their mast-heads, reflected in the mirror below, and their decks alive with sailors, stripped for the work before them. On the shore were drawn up the long lines of the British troops, with their brilliant uniforms and flashing bayonets, and at their head General Howe, attired as for a festival, and surrounded by his staff, glittering with military trappings. Ranged in front frowned the grim artillery, ready to launch from their brazen throats the messengers of death upon the hostile lines.

Inland, on the eminence opposite the left of the British formation, rose the sandy ridge of Prescott's earthworks, giving no outward sign of the life within. Directly in front of the British, and a little retired, were the fences behind which lay the New Hampshire troops of Stark and Reed. They had only the pretence of discipline which a few days' training could impart, but they were not unprepared for the ordeal which awaited them. Poorly equipped as they were, they were covered by the panoply of a cause which they felt to be supremely just. The view of the spectators, who crowded the surrounding heights and housetops, must have inspired them with a resolve to quit themselves like men; the approving God-speed of their nearest and dearest, whom they had left at their homes among the Granite Hills, still lingered in their ears; and the solemn assurances of their spiritual guides that the blessings of Heaven rested upon their cause nerved their arms and gave confidence to their hearts.

The ominous silence before the strife is broken by a signal from the British commander. The picture starts into life and action. The hosts of red-coated soldiery move forward in columns, their advance covered by a furious cannonade from the artillery, the shipping, and the battery at Copps' Hill in Boston. Slowly they take their way under the June sun,— a part under General Pigot to attack the earthworks, the re-

mainder along the bank and margin of the Mystic to make a simultaneous assault upon the troops at the rail fence.

It is the latter movement, threatening the regiments of New Hampshire, that we now follow. The light infantry in solid column pursue their allotted march along the sandy shore; the grenadiers spread into line on the higher ground, and pour volleys as they advance into the silent lines before them.¹ The provincials, in obedience to the cautions of their experienced officers, reserve their slender stock of ammunition until the distance is lessened, so that they can make every shot tell. On press the assailants, their confidence redoubled as they near their enemy without apparent opposition. "Will the cowardly Yankees fly without a shadow of resistance?" they ask themselves. The answer comes as sudden and as fatal as a bolt from heaven. A sheet of flame leaps from the whole line of the provincials; and in an instant the front of the assailing force, but now so trim and orderly, is changed into a mass of prostrate and struggling humanity, shattered and helpless. Vainly strive those gallant grenadiers and light infantry to make headway against the pitiless storm of fire that confronts them. Another and another rank melts before it. Human nature is incapable of further enduring a tempest so destructive, and the remnants of those proud columns hurry out of the reach of the death-dealing fusillade.

But with disciplined soldiers a repulse is not a defeat. British pride in the invincibility of their arms is roused. The high-spirited officers reform the thinned ranks, appeal to the national honor and pluck, and bring their men a second time to the attack.

Again the provincials behind the fences defer all reply to the fire of the British until they come within the same short range. But when the fatal line is once more reached, the same torrent of leaden rain breaks forth anew, and decimates again and again the staggering ranks of the assailants. With the obstinacy of their race and a dogged determination to carry their point, they hold their ground, and strive with desperation to advance; but the carnage inflicted by the

¹ Note IV.

defenders of that frail barrier is so frightful and continuous that further persistence means mere butchery, and a second time the lessened columns of the assailants rush out of the terrific slaughter, and are with difficulty rallied.

By these two bloody repulses General Howe is convinced that he cannot force his way by the shore of the Mystic, and is driven to change his tactics. He resolves now to bring in front of the American left wing only a force sufficient to hold the provincials there in check, and to throw the entire residue of the force under his orders against the other portion of the American line. He frees the troops from the incumbrance of their knapsacks and directs Pigot, who has twice led his battalions without effect against the earthworks simultaneously with the assaults upon the rail fence, to push his men forward in column, without firing or an instant's pause, until they reach the works.¹ Reinforcements have opportunely arrived; and General Clinton appears from Boston, and puts himself at their head.

The new manœuvre is successful. The breastwork being enfiladed by cannon, and the redoubt assaulted on three sides, its garrison, thinned in numbers, weakened by hunger and toil, and become weaponless by the exhaustion of their ammunition, by order of their commander sullenly retreat fighting; and the dear-bought intrenchments are thronged with the victorious enemy. But the defenders of the rail fence and the shore of the Mystic still retain their position; and not until their compatriots at the redoubt make good their retreat do they quit the line they so resolutely held, and retire.² The British make no pursuit.

Though the battle of Bunker Hill was a technical defeat, it was a moral victory, for the Americans. More than once afterward during the war its impression and influence on the minds of the British commanders operated powerfully to save the little patriot army of the Americans from disaster, if not from annihilation. The prodigious havoc wrought by the fire of the provincials' musketry amazed and appalled their adver-

¹ Note V.

² Note VI.

saries, and changed their contempt for the fighting capacity of the colonists into a wholesome respect for their dogged persistency and efficiency in the use of arms. The slaughter of the Britons, in view of their numbers and of the duration of the action, was well-nigh unexampled. At least one in every three of the assailing force was killed or wounded, and this mainly by the fire of small-arms alone, for the American artillery was of little value. The time occupied by the engagement was an hour and a half, from which should be deducted the intervals occupied by two successive retreats and rallies.

The whole number of casualties suffered by the Americans was only about three sevenths of the aggregate of those of the British. This includes, not only those caused by the fire of small-arms, but also those due to the cannonade for hours kept up by the artillery from the shipping and from Boston, which was especially galling at the Charlestown Neck, over which all the provincials were obliged to pass.

Remarkable as is this contrast between the total losses of the contending parties, still more astonishing is that between the loss of the defenders of the rail fence and Mystic shore and that of their particular antagonists. The two New Hampshire regiments, constituting more than four fifths of the force which held that line, went into the action about nine hundred strong, and lost, according to returns made at the time, ninety-three men, — a little above one in every ten.¹ The loss of the twenty-two companies of grenadiers and light infantry in their successive onslaughts on that part of the American line, as calculated on the basis of actual returns, was not less than five hundred and fifty-one of their eight hundred and fifty-eight men, — nearly two of every three of their whole number, and almost double the average of the entire British casualties. It is safe to say that the execution done by the fire of the Americans at this Aceldama, this veritable field of blood, was proportionately more than fivefold greater than that of the select British companies.²

How is this prodigious disparity in losses to be accounted for? Not, surely, by the assumption that the Americans were

¹ Note VII.

² Note VIII.

sheltered, while their opponents were wholly exposed; for the rail fences afforded only the shadow of protection against bullets. The true explanation is found in the marksmanship of the Americans and the ignorance of their antagonists of the art of accurate shooting. The former always took exact aim, and could send their bullets true to the mark. To their skill is to be ascribed the greater mortality among the British officers. Their "handsome coats" and airs of command rendered them especially conspicuous targets for the sharp-shooting provincials. On the other hand, a large proportion of the bullets of the British flew high above the ranks of their opponents, and shattered the branches of the trees over their heads.

The reason for this difference of skill in the use of firearms between the two peoples is not far to seek. For centuries before this time laws had been in force in Britain which prohibited all persons, except those enjoying a special property qualification, from killing game. The practical operation of this legislation was to preclude every one who did not belong to the higher ranks of society from all sport with the gun. Whole generations had passed away without the slightest acquaintance with firearms. Of the class from which the army was chiefly recruited, not one in a hundred had ever held a musket in his hand before taking the King's shilling. The soldiery received practically no instruction how to acquire accuracy in shooting, and when brought into action fired without taking particular aim.

But from the necessities of their situation, the colonists had to familiarize themselves from their childhood with the use of firearms. Game was free to all, and a main resource for food. On their skill as marksmen depended their subsistence and not seldom their personal security. No man walked the woods without his gun by his side, and shooting-matches and hunting-parties were their favorite diversions. When the rustic soldiers of Stark and Reed disposed themselves behind the grass-lined fences, each one prepared his loop-hole or rest to enable him to take exact aim; and he would have been a poor marksman who was not at the distance of eight

or ten rods morally sure of hitting an object far smaller than the body of a man.

The vitally important service which the New Hampshire troops rendered at Bunker Hill is wholly attributable to the destructive efficiency of their fire; but for that, it is no discredit to them to say that they could never have held their ground. Not that they had not abundant spirit and bodily vigor; but the troops opposed to them were picked men, armed and familiar with the bayonet, their pride and boast. Could they have once reached the lines of the provincials, the latter, without bayonets or any other weapons of defence at close quarters, could not have stood a moment before them. Had it not been for the close, rapid, continuous, exact shooting of the provincials who held the ground between the intrenchments and the Mystic, by which the British advance was simply paralyzed, I do not see how the battle could have been prolonged above half an hour.

And when the brave defenders of the earthworks were overpowered and compelled to retire, they would have been completely at the mercy of the victors, had not their countrymen at the rail fence maintained their position, and held the enemy in check. Without that formidable rear-guard, the party that had quitted the redoubt in disorder and with empty muskets must have been destroyed or captured. The British were well aware that they could not follow too closely upon the retreating foe without bringing upon their backs an enemy that they had twice found invincible in their front, and they chose rather to relinquish their prey. So the remains of Prescott's command were enabled to perfect their retreat. The New Hampshire regiments and their comrades behind that frail apology for a cover were never defeated in the battle. They simply quitted a position which had become untenable, and marched unconquered from the ground which their valor had made famous for all time.¹

The men who maintained so tenacious a grip upon the rail fence consisted of the detachment from Putnam's Connecticut regiment already mentioned, under Knowlton, together with

¹ Note IX.

a company of Spencer's Connecticut regiment, under Captain Chester, which appeared and took part in the action shortly before it terminated; a small but unascertained number of Massachusetts men; and the two New Hampshire regiments, the only entire American regiments on the field. The great bulk of the defenders of that critical point in the line of battle were unquestionably, in the words of one of their number on a subsequent occasion, "full-blooded Yankees from New Hampshire." And it was they alone who closed the dangerous pass by the Mystic shore with an impenetrable wall of fire. Without the mighty co-operation of the regiments of Stark and Reed, what could have saved the Americans from speedy and utter rout?

Justice requires that another body of New Hampshire men, smaller in number, but no less faithful to duty, who were stationed in the redoubt, and took part in constructing and defending it, should not be forgotten on this occasion. Their names were borne on the rolls of Massachusetts regiments, into which they enlisted from the New Hampshire towns of which they were citizens. Among them was an entire company of fifty-nine men in Colonel Prescott's regiment, under the command of Capt. Reuben Dow, all of Hollis. As many more New Hampshire men were members of the same or of Frye's regiment. That all or nearly all these were actively engaged in the battle, their loss of eight killed and nine wounded attests.¹ The exact value of their service cannot be so well measured as that of their fellow-provincials at the rail fence and the shore of the Mystic; but their meed of honor, whatever it be, inures equally to the credit of the province to which they belonged.

The story of New Hampshire at Bunker Hill would be but half told if it were to omit a description of the leading men who were among the combatants. They were of the prominent moving spirits of the American Revolution, and imparted their own patriotic fervor and constancy to those about them. If they had been wanting in the hour of danger, all would

¹ Note X.

have been lost. Their faith, their firmness, their courage were potent factors to control the fortunes of the battle. Their history is the exponent of the spirit of Bunker Hill. Of two of them the earthly record closed on that eventful day.

ANDREW McCLARY was the major of Stark's regiment. In his veins ran the fighting Scotch-Irish blood. He was a man of heroic mould, — physically of lofty stature and handsome face and figure, and in disposition independent, daring, a true son of liberty. At his public-house in Epsom the bolder spirits of the countryside had been used to resort for the discussion of the political troubles of the time. The news of the collision between the British regulars and the "embattled farmers" at Concord reached him while he was ploughing in his field, and he delayed not a moment to start for the scene of action. His popular talents, his high courage, and his devotion to his country's cause pointed him out for responsible military command; and his appointment was amply justified by his behavior on this his first and last battle-field. His clarion voice uttering words of encouragement and cheer rose above the din of the conflict, and roused his soldiers to redoubled efforts. After the retreat, "as attentive to the wants of his men as desperate in fighting them," he hurried off to Medford to procure dressings for the wounded. On his return, as he was engaged in reconnoitring the enemy, a chance shot from the shipping set loose as gallant a soul as ever contended in the cause of liberty.

ISAAC BALDWIN, a captain in Stark's regiment, was an inhabitant of Hillsborough. He had served in Rogers's famous rangers in the French and Indian wars, and is said to have fought in twenty engagements. Immediately upon hearing of the battle of Lexington he raised a band of volunteers, and marched to Cambridge. His military experience and known capacity for command secured him a full company of the men from his own vicinity. In the midst of the battle of Bunker Hill, while animating them by his voice and exam-

ple, he was pierced in the breast by a musket-ball, and borne from the field by two of his townsmen. With the going down of the sun his own life's day came to an end. Many a manly tear was shed when Baldwin fell.

WILLIAM SCOTT, one of Stark's lieutenants, was of Scotch-Irish lineage, and belonged to Peterborough. His life was as full of adventure as that of one of the paladins of old. At the age of seventeen he saw service in the French war, in the New Hampshire regiment of Colonel Goffe. In the peace which followed he established the reputation of being a mighty hunter of the wild beasts of the forest. His daring disposition carried him to the spot which promised fighting, and he was given a commission, probably in one of Stark's supernumerary companies. He was not the man to miss the pleasure of a battle, and of course he was at Bunker Hill. In the earlier part of the engagement one of the bones of his leg was fractured by a ball. But this did not incapacitate him for duty, and he continued to trim the bullets to fit the bore of his men's guns. Nor did it repress his indomitable sense of grim humor. "The chaplain prayed that our heads might be sheltered in the hour of battle," said he. "My head is safe enough; his prayer should have extended to the rest of the body." He continued fighting manfully till on the retreat he received four other wounds, and fell fainting to the ground. When he recovered his consciousness, a British soldier was standing over him, who asked him with an oath why he did not deserve to be killed. "I am in your power," said Scott, "and you can do with me as you please." He was saved by the interposition of a British officer, and confined as a prisoner in jail until the evacuation of Boston, the following March. Then he was taken to Halifax, and there incarcerated. Furnished by a friendly hand with a ginlet, a bayonet, and a knife, he and six companions undermined the wall of their prison and made their escape, and eventually returned to Boston, then in the possession of the patriots.

True to his instinct to find his way to the place of danger, Scott was in the following November serving in the garrison

of Fort Washington, when it was carried by assault and surrendered to the British. But in the following night he succeeded in regaining his liberty by swimming the Hudson River, his sword tied to the back of his neck, and his watch fastened to his hatband. In December, 1776, he was commissioned captain in Colonel Cilley's regiment of the New Hampshire line, and served throughout the war. He received repeated promotions for his gallantry and good conduct, and was in 1782 major-commandant of one of the New Hampshire battalions. In 1792 he was capsized in a boat in the river near Philadelphia by a violent squall, with nine other persons, of whom four were children, and none able to swim except himself. By almost superhuman exertions he succeeded in saving them all. He made his way first to the shore with one child hanging round his neck and one clinging to each arm, and then returned through the boisterous waves to the boat, on which the others had taken refuge, and brought them successively safe to land.

The termination of Scott's eventful life was caused by exposure on an errand of mercy. In 1796 he was, when in impaired health, engaged with a party in surveying lands near Lake Erie. They were attacked by lake fever, and Scott returned with a division of the sick to Port Stanwix. Finding it difficult to procure any person to go back to succor the sufferers left behind in the wilderness, he determined to do so in person, against the remonstrances of his physician, who declared that he could never return alive. "My life," said Scott, "is no better than theirs." He rescued the sick men, but in so doing he sacrificed himself, and died in ten days after his return from his heroic undertaking.

The history of JOHN STARK is familiar. His character as a soldier may be read in his words spoken while leading his regiment over Charlestown Neck to Bunker Hill. It was dangerous ground, for the cannon of the enemy were pouring their shot upon it without ceasing. One of his captains urged that the regiment should quicken their step. "One fresh man in action is worth ten tired ones," replied Stark,

and continued his march at the same deliberate pace. His conduct in the battle was marked by the same calm intrepidity. Ammunition was scarce and precious, and only a gill of powder and fifteen bullets had been supplied to each of his men. That their fire might not be wasted, he is said to have set up a mark in the ground at a short gunshot distance in front of his line, and warned his men not to pull a trigger until it should be reached by the enemy.

At the capture of Rall and his Hessians at Trenton, the first gleam of victory that shone upon the American arms under Washington, Stark led his regiment in the van of one of the columns. Three months later he took offence at the promotion by Congress of a junior officer over his head, and resigned his commission. But he was of too valuable stuff to lie idle when his country was in trouble. Another three months had scarcely expired before the descent of Burgoyne from Canada at the head of a powerful and admirably appointed army aroused apprehensions, which were quickened into dismay and terror when Ticonderoga, the boasted stronghold of the north, was evacuated in hot haste on his approach. New Hampshire then summoned Stark from his retirement, put him in command of a brigade, and sent him to the post of danger. He found the enemy, and cried to his men, "We must beat the redcoats, or my wife sleeps a widow to-night." The victory of Bennington was the turning-point of the Revolution. It stemmed the tide of invasion, and led directly to the capture of Burgoyne and his army. Congress recognized the value of Stark's services by promotion, and he succeeded in the last year of the war to the command of the army of the North. When peace was won, he retired upon his farm, and there lived to become the last survivor of the American general officers of the Revolution.

JAMES REED, the colonel of the third New Hampshire regiment, was a resident of Fitzwilliam, and had hastened at the first alarm with a company of more than fifty of his townsmen to Cambridge. As the commander of a regiment he proved himself to have a comprehension of his duties as a

disciplinarian rare in that stage of the war. In the battle of Bunker Hill he performed his duty without display, but with fidelity and quiet courage. He is said to have been the last officer to leave the field. After the evacuation of Boston he led his regiment to Canada to reinforce the American troops that were on the retreat from Quebec. At Crown Point he was attacked with fever, the result of exposure and hardship, and, probably from want of suitable attendance, suffered the loss of his sight. From this, the heaviest privation of life, there was no recovery; and though Congress had conferred upon him the rank of brigadier-general, he was compelled to bid adieu to the camp and the battle-field forever. He lived many years after; and it was a touching spectacle to see him and a friend of his own advanced age, who was partially disabled by paralysis, walking the streets of Keene together. The blind supplied feet to the lame, and the lame furnished eyes to the blind.

Next in consequence and in influence to the chief officer of a regiment ranked in those days the chaplain. Rev. SAMUEL McCLINTOCK — afterward D.D., before that title had become cheapened by being so commonly conferred — held that office in Stark's regiment. A graduate of Princeton College, his high scholarship brought him the offer of an appointment as tutor; but he preferred to fit himself for the gospel ministry. For forty-eight years he was the pastor of the town of Greenland, notwithstanding repeated offers of positions esteemed more eligible, and certainly more lucrative. In teaching his parishioners the way to heaven, he did not forget the virtues of courage and patriotism. His discourses were redolent of the spirit of liberty. Nor was he the kind of shepherd to send his flock into dangers that he was unwilling to share. When the order came for his regiment to proceed to Bunker Hill, he marched with them, ready not only to soothe the last moments of the dying, but also to set a manly example to the living. We do not learn that he fought with carnal weapons; but we cannot doubt that he infused his own confident and dauntless spirit into his men, and heartened them for the

combat. In Trumbull's great painting of the battle, in which his purpose evidently was to include the principal characters present rather than to depict the scene as it actually appeared, this valiant servant of God is fitly represented in the thickest of the fray.

NATHAN HALE, who bore the same name, and was, I believe, of kindred blood, with the youthful hero whose tragic fate saddens the early annals of the Revolutionary contest, was the major of Reed's regiment. He too was among the foremost at Cambridge at the head of a body of minute-men. He served with credit at Bunker Hill, in Canada, at Trenton and Princeton, and established his character as a resolute and efficient officer. Upon the retirement of Colonel Reed and the reorganization of the regiment, in 1777, Hale succeeded to its command. Stationed at Ticonderoga under General St. Clair, he was involved in the misfortunes attending the evacuation of that post when threatened by Burgoyne.

Colonel Hale's regiment was in the rear-guard of the column which withdrew from the fort on the eastern side of Lake Champlain, and was ordered to cover the retreat of the invalids; who were very numerous. Through no fault of his, they fell some miles in the rear of the main body, and were suddenly and furiously attacked at an early hour in the morning by General Fraser, supported by General Riedesel, with some of the choicest of Burgoyne's troops. The result was the dispersion of his regiment, and the capture of himself and several of his officers and nearly one hundred of his soldiers. It was a time when suspicion was rife against the best men. Hale's misfortune was attributed by envious tongues to cowardice or incapacity. No sooner did he hear of these imputations than he demanded from the commander-in-chief an opportunity to vindicate his conduct before a military tribunal. But he was a prisoner of the enemy, and the privilege of confronting his accusers was never his. He died in captivity in 1780. It is due to his memory to add that the charges against him have been fully refuted by modern historians, and his reputation has been vindicated from every injurious aspersion.

The biography of HENRY DEARBORN, who was a captain in Stark's regiment, is a part of the history of the country for half a century. He was an officer in Arnold's daring and adventurous expedition to Quebec, was taken prisoner at the attack of the city under the gallant Montgomery, distinguished himself in the battles which wrought the surrender of Burgoyne, accompanied Sullivan on his expedition against the Indians in 1779, and took part in the campaign which culminated in the fall of Yorktown. Later he was Jefferson's Secretary of War, and senior major-general of the army of the United States.

I have no time to do more than name a few others of the men of sterling character who represented New Hampshire on the battle-field of Bunker Hill. ISRAEL GILMAN, ISAAC WYMAN, GEORGE REID, STEPHEN PEABODY, MICHAEL McCLARY, and others, who might with equal propriety be included, though not known so widely as some of those I have described, like them diffused the leaven of patriotism through the communities in which they dwelt, and cheerfully risked all upon the issue of the struggle for freedom. They surely deserve not to be passed by in silence in reckoning the elements of strength which their province contributed to resist the disciplined legions of Britain on their errand of conquest.

The stately obelisk which stands sentinel over the historic battle-ground seems to me fitly built of imperishable granite, the emblem of the province whose stalwart sons took so leading a part in rendering the spot worthy of a monument.

I fear that in the endeavor to do full justice to New Hampshire, I may have seemed to belittle the invaluable services performed by her sister colonies of Massachusetts and Connecticut at Bunker Hill. Nothing could be further from my intention.

It was the fortune of Connecticut to furnish the least number of men on the occasion. But her Putnam, her Durkee, her Knowlton, her Chester, her Webb more than compensated for the lack of superior numbers. Her troops

were on the line of greatest exposure, by the side of those of New Hampshire, and participated with them in the intrepid stand made against the flower of the British army.

Massachusetts, too, "needs no encomium." Prescott, Gridley, Pomeroy, Gardner, Parker, Moore, and above all Warren, — that dauntless hero, whose fervid utterances, from a soul instinct with the love of liberty, have waked the echoes of these hallowed walls,¹ — Warren, who proved in his own person how pleasant and honorable was death to him who fell in defence of his country, — these are names that will ever be associated with the memory of Bunker Hill. The troops of Massachusetts, both those who toiled the livelong night to raise the intrenchments and those who came in from her various organizations to aid in defending them, fought strenuously till their means of resistance failed. Then, overborne by British bayonets, they reluctantly quitted the ground, but not until they had done enough for lasting fame.

Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, whatever the inequality in their several contributions to the battle, are equal partners in the glory of Bunker Hill.

¹ The Address was delivered in the Old South Church.

NOTES TO MR. BELL'S ADDRESS.

I. PAGE 36. — THE NUMBER OF NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS ASSEMBLED AT CAMBRIDGE AFTER THE NEWS FROM LEXINGTON AND CONCORD.

See letter of Andrew McClary, dated Cambridge, April 23, 1775.
7 *New Hampshire Provincial Papers*, 460.

II. PAGE 39. — THE POSITION OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENTS AT THE RAIL FENCE AND MYSTIC SHORE.

Potter's *Military History of New Hampshire*, 270, 271. 13 *Historical Magazine*, 344. Dearborn's *Account of the Battle of Burker Hill*. *Plans of De Berniere and Page*.

III. PAGE 39. — NUMBER OF COMPANIES OF BRITISH LIGHT INFANTRY AND GRENADIERS.

The British "morning orders," as they appear in the orderly-book of Adjutant Waller, required "the *ten* oldest companies of grenadiers and light infantry (exclusive of the 35th and 49th regiments, just arrived)" to parade, etc. (Frothingham's *Siege of Boston*, 130). It has been assumed by writers, without an exception that I remember, that this was the actual number of companies in the assault on the American left. But an inspection of De Berniere's plan shows that there were *eleven* companies of light infantry there engaged, one of which was that of the 35th regiment, which had been excepted in "morning orders," because it had just arrived. This is confirmed in the case of Edward Drewe, 13 *Historical Magazine*, 368. The "return of losses" indicates that both that and the grenadier company of the 35th regiment were in the action; for the loss of the 35th regiment was 69, nearly double the entire number of the light infantry company, and we know the "battalion" (that is, the line companies) of the 35th were not in the action. The loss must therefore have been in the light infantry and grenadiers. The number of light infantry and grenadier companies in that part of the field, therefore, must have been eleven of each.

See also the plan in Swett's *Account of the Battle*.

IV. PAGE 41. — THE MARCH AND ATTACK OF THE BRITISH LIGHT INFANTRY AND GRENADIERS.

The contemporaneous plans of the battle by De Berniere and Page delineate exactly the course which each of these corps followed, the former plan representing the companies of light infantry in column on the Mystic beach, with the numbers of the regiments to which they belonged. Mr. Frothingham declares these plans to be entitled to entire confidence, in *Proceedings of Massachusetts Historical Society*, June 10, 1875, page 60.

See also 13 *Historical Magazine*, 344. Gage's *Report of the Battle*. 1 Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, 845. Frothingham's *Siege of Boston*, 141.

V. PAGE 42. — HOWE'S CHANGE OF PLAN OF ATTACK.

Frothingham's *Siege of Boston*, 148. 1 Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, 846.

VI. PAGE 42. — THE TROOPS AT THE RAIL FENCE REMAINED TILL THOSE FROM THE REDOUBT EFFECTED THEIR RETREAT.

Frothingham's *Siege of Boston*, 151, 152. 1 Wilkinson's *Memoirs*, 847. 7 Bancroft's *History of the United States*, 430.

VII. PAGE 43. — STRENGTH OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENTS.

The official return of Reed's regiment, June 14, 1775, three days before the battle, shows that it then contained, effectives fit for duty, 488 men; sick, absent, unfit, and on command, 149 men. The provision return of Stark's regiment, July 1, 1775, shows that it then contained 794 men. These are the nearest returns, in point of time, to the battle, now to be found. The loss of Stark's regiment in the battle was 15 killed and 45 wounded. Assuming that one half the wounded were back in the ranks by July 1, there would be the number of the killed (15) and the other half of the wounded (22), which should be added to the 794 to make the number what it was at the beginning of the battle: $794 + 15 + 22 = 831$. Deducting from this total a number proportioned to that returned in Reed's regiment for the sick, etc., say 194, we have remaining, effectives fit for duty, 637. The number of effectives fit for duty on the day of the battle must have been, —

In Stark's regiment	637 men
“ Reed's “	488 “
	1,125 “

The estimate, therefore, that the two regiments went in 900 strong is certainly not too high, perhaps not high enough.

See on this subject 31 *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, 35. 1 *Proceedings of New Hampshire Historical Society*, 359. 14 *New Hampshire Provincial Papers*, 41, 42.

VIII. PAGE 43. — NUMBERS AND LOSSES OF THE BRITISH LIGHT INFANTRY AND GRENADIERS.

There were eleven companies of each led against the Americans at the Mystic shore and the rail fence, as is shown in Note III. The strength of each company was 39 or 40 men when complete (Clarke's *Impartial and Authentic Narrative*, 15; *Detail and Conduct of the American War*, 13). Of course the companies were not always full when they went into action. The light infantry company of the 35th regiment had at Bunker Hill 38 men (*The Case of Edward Drewe*, 13 *Historical Magazine*, 368). Assuming the companies to have had a uniform strength of 39 men each, the aggregate number in 22 companies would have been 858 men.

The light infantry companies referred to were those of the 4th, 5th, 10th, 23d, 35th, 38th, 43d, 47th, 52d, 59th, and 65th regiments; and the grenadier companies were doubtless from the same regiments. The 5th, 38th, 43d, 47th, and 52d regiments were in the battle; and their losses were returned aggregated, without distinguishing those suffered by their light infantry and grenadier companies. But of the 4th, 10th, 23d, 35th, 59th, and 65th regiments *only* the light infantry and grenadier companies were in the action; and their losses form a basis from which a calculation can be made of the losses of the remaining light infantry and grenadiers which cannot be far wrong. The losses specially returned of the light infantry and grenadiers are as follows:—

4th regiment, 14 killed, 35 wounded	49
10th " 7 " 46 "	53
23d " 14 " 42 "	56
35th " 19 " 50 "	69
59th " 6 " 26 "	32
65th " 10 " 32 "	42

Total, in 12 companies, out of (12×39) 468 men 301

A like proportion in the 22 companies would make their losses 551 out of 858 men, or nearly two out of every three. These prodigious losses are partially confirmed by other testimony. Clarke states that all the grenadiers of the 4th regiment were killed or wounded except four, and all those of the 23d regiment except three (Clarke's *Narrative*, 15). "Most of our grenadiers and light infantry, the moment of presenting themselves, lost three fourths and many nine tenths of their men. Some had only eight or nine men a company left; some, only three, four, and five" (*Detail and Conduct of American War*). Of the light company of the 35th regiment, 10 were killed and 25 wounded; only 3 escaped unhurt (*Historical Magazine*, 369). Gen. John Winslow stated that he visited the field the day after the battle, and counted ninety-six men dead *on the beach* that had not been removed when he arrived (13 *Historical Magazine*, 418).

IX. PAGE 45. — THE TROOPS AT THE RAIL FENCE SAVED THE REST FROM DESTRUCTION.

The courage and conduct of the provincials that opposed the light infantry saved their compatriots, who were overpowered and were obliged to retreat from the fort, and who must otherwise have been cut off; as the enemy, but for such opposition, would have been instantly upon the back of the redoubt (2 Gordon's *History of American War*, 46; 1 Botta's *History of American War*, 206). The little handful of brave men (from the redoubt) would have been effectually cut off but for the unfailing courage of the provincials at the rail fence and the bank of the Mystic. They had repulsed the enemy twice; they now held them in check till the main body had left the hill. Not till then did the Connecticut companies under Knowlton and the New Hampshire soldiers under Stark quit the station which they had "nobly defended."

7 Bancroft's *History of the United States*, 430. Frothingham's *Siege of Boston*, 151. Peter Thacher's *Narration*, 13 *Historical Magazine*, 383.

X. PAGE 46. — NUMBER AND LOSSES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE MEN IN MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENTS.

1 *Proceedings of New Hampshire Historical Society*, 359, etc. 14 *New Hampshire Provincial Papers*, 39, etc.

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